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CASE NOTES
28

decided in 1964, the Illinois Appellate Court held for proration in
adopting the Oregon view. Earlier, the Illinois Appellate Court had
adopted the same view in Laurie v. Holland America Ins. Co. 2 9 and
Continental Casualty Co. v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co.80 However,
Illinois through the present decision has placed itself firmly within the
majority. Even though the minority has been adopted in several states,8 '
it does not represent the current trend. It appears from a survey of the
recent cases involving the excess v. escape controversy that the majority
position as evidenced by the case at bar, has continued to influence courts
2
throughout the country.
Co.,

Donald Lavin
2849 Ill. App. 2d 59, 198 N.E.2d 723 (1964), subsequently overruled in Jensen v.
New Amsterdam Ins. Co., 65 111. App. 2d 407, 213 N.E.2d 141 (1965).
29 31 Ill. App. 2d 437, 176 N.E.2d 678 (1961).

80 28 Ill. App. 2d 489, 171 N.E.2d 406 (1960).
81 Continental Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 163 F.Supp. 325
(D.C. Fla. 1958); Arditi v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 315 S.W.2d 736 (Mo. 1958);
Cosmopolitan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 28 N.J. 554, 147 A.2d 529 (1959);
Reetz v. Werch, supra note 24; Farmers Insur. Exch. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New
York, 374 P.2d 754 (Wyo. 1962).
32 Continental Cas. Co. v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 275 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1960);
Fund Insurance Group, 262 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1958); American Surety Co. of New
York v. Canal Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1958); United Services Automobile Assoc.
v. Russom, 241 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1957); Citizens Cas. Co. of New York v. Allied Mutual
Ins. Co., 217 Md. 494, 144 A.2d 73 (1958); General Ace. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v.
Piazza, 4 N.Y.2d 659, 176 N.Y.S.2d 976, 152 N.E.2d 236 (1958).

SALES-UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-IMPLIED

WARRANTY AGAINST OBSCENITY
Plaintiff, a liquor store owner, brought an action for breach of implied
warranty against a magazine distributor who had sold him certain magazines. After reselling some of the magazines to the public, it was determined by the Liquor Control Commission that they contained obscene
material. As a result, plaintiff could not resell any more of these magazines
and also had his liquor license revoked. In his complaint, the plaintiff
asserted that the defendant had breached his implied warranty that the
magazines were merchantable' and fit for the purpose of resale. 2 The CirI UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314. The Uniform Commercial Code became
effective in Illinois on July 1, 1962. To date the Code has been adopted or is in effect
in every state except Arizona, Idaho, and Louisiana. 3 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
REPORTING SERVICE Release 5 (July 6, 1966).
2
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315.
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cuit Court of Cook County dismissed the complaint and on appeal, the
Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed on the ground that the plaintiff knew
or should have known that the magazines were obscene. Haralampopoulos
v. Capital News Agency, Inc., 70 Ill. App. 2d 17, 217 N.E.2d 366 (1966).
The Haralampopouloscase is important in that it is the first attempt to
extend the implied warranties section of the Uniform Commercial Code8
to cover the sale of obscene magazines.4 The purpose of this note will be
to explore the theory of implied warranties, the extent to which they are
used now and how they may be applied in the future.
Originally, breach of warranty was a tort; the action as upon the case
for the breach of an assumed duty and the wrong was a form of misrepresentation. 5 Shortly after 1750, an express warranty began to be recognized
as a term of the contract of sale. 6 By 1810, implied warranties of quality
were first established and the assumpsit action was accepted as matter of
8
course. 7 In the early leading case on implied warranty, Gardinerv. Gray,
Lord Ellenborough ruled that, "the purchaser has a right to expect a
salable article ... without any particular warranty; this is an implied term

in every such contract." The English courts expanded Lord Ellenborough's implied warranty theory to warrant the merchantable character of goods sold by a manufacturer or a dealer. 10 The majority of American courts, however, did not extend the implied warranty to dealers prior
to the enactment of the Sales Act." With the passage of the Uniform
Sales Act, 12 American courts began to hold dealers subject to implied warranties whether or not they had manufactured the product they sold.'8
The Sales Act refined the common law and codified the implied warranty
into two distinct types, the implied warranty that the product is fit for a
8 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S§ 2-314, 2-315.

4Haralampopoulos v. Capital News Agency, Inc., 70 II. App. 2d 17, 217 N.E.2d 366
(1966).

5 Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 HAav. L. REV. 1, 8 (1888).
6 Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117,
119 (1943).
7 Id. at 120.
84 Campb. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (1815). See also, Holcombe v. Hewson, 2 Campb.
391, 170 Eng. Rep. 1194 (1810).
9 Id. at 145, 171 Eng. Rep. at 47.
10 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 233, at 596 (3d ed. 1948).
11 Id.at 597.
12 The Uniform Sales Act was eventually adopted by 36 states and the District of
Columbia. Left as common law states were Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, with Louisiana as a civil law state. UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED,
SALES § 1 (1964 Supp.).
1 Hensley, The Implied Warranty of Merchantability, 48 VA. L. REv. 152, 160
(1962).
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particular purpose and the implied warranty that the goods are of
5
merchantable quality.'
An implied warranty is not a specific promise by the seller but is read
into a contract by operation of law. 16 It imposes the requirement that the
goods be merchantable; that they are salable in the market,'" of a quality
comparable to that generally acceptable in that line of trade,' 8 and their
sale or resale in the same market does not violate any applicable statute. 19
The implied warranty that the product is fit for a particular purpose exists
when the buyer's purpose is made known to the seller and the seller has
undertaken the responsibility of supplying it.20 These two implied warranties are neither inconsistent nor mutually exclusive and where both are
present recovery for the breach of implied warranty may be based on
21
either one.
The warranties under the Uniform Commercial Code 22 are substantially
the same as the Uniform Sales Act with some extensions.23 Section 2-314
provides that:
Unless excluded or modified [a] warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind.... Goods to be merchantable must be at least
such as [pass] without objection in the trade under the contract description;
[and] are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. ....
Unless excluded or modified . . . other implied warranties may arise from
course of dealing or usage of trade. 24
4
1 U iFORM SALES ACT § 15-1: "Where the buyer, expressly or by implication,
makes known to the seller, the particular purpose for which the goods are required,
and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be

the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall
be reasonably fit for such purposes." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121J, § 15-1 (1959), repealed
(1962) and replaced by UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE, ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 26 (1962).
15
UNIFORM SALES ACT § 15-2: "Where the goods are bought by description from a
seller who deals in goods of that description... there is an implied warranty that the
goods shall be of merchantable quality." ILL. Rjv. STAT. ch. 1211, 5 15-2 (1959), repealed (1962). This section is copied almost verbatim from 5 14-2 of the ENGLISH SALE

OF GOODS ACT of 1893 which was itself a restatement and codification of the common
law of England as existed at that date.
16 Warranties in llinois-A Symposium, 59 U. hIL. L.F. 1057, 1061 (1959).
'7 Supra note 6, at 127.
18
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, official comment 2 to § 2-314.
19 Supra note 6, at 129.
20 Id. at 133.
21 Ibid. See also Crotty v. Shartenberg's-New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 162 A.2d
513 (1960).
22 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §S 2-314, 2-315.
28

FLEMING, SYLLABUS ON SALES UNDER DIVIsION 2 OF THE CALIFORNIA UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 10TH ANNUAL SUMMER PROGRAM FOR CALIFORNIA LAWYERS 5. See also

De Graff v. Myers Food, Inc. 19 Pa. D.&C.2d 19 (1958).
24
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S 2-314.
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Section 2-315, applicable to the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose states: "[w]here the seller at the time of contracting has reason to
know any particular purpose for which the goods are required... there is
an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purposes." 25
In the Haralampopouloscase, the plaintiff claims that both warranties
were breached. 20 He contends that the magazines sold to him were not
merchantable because they were declared obscene and that they were not
fit for his particular purpose, known to the defendant, which was resale to
the public. A close examination of the Code seems to indicate that in the
Haralampopoulos case, the factual situation fits within the limits prescribed by sections 2-314 and 2-315. Though section 2-314 defines merchantability, it does not purport to exhaust the meaning of merchantable
or negate any attributes not specifically mentioned in the text.27 The language categorically states that if, in any given situation, it is felt that a
buyer should be allowed to recover, the courts may impose a new quality
obligation on a seller and establish new standards. 28 Under section 2-314, if
the purchaser is buying for resale to the ultimate consumer, the goods
must be honestly resellable in the normal course of business. 29 This warranty is broad and comprehensive and does not frustrate future development as further evidenced by subsection (3), which states that, "[o]ther
implied warranties may arise from course of dealing. .... 0
The Haralampopoulos facts show that the magazines could not be
honestly resold in the normal course of business because they were declared obscene within the purview of the applicable local ordinance.8 '
Thus, it would seem that the seller breached his implied warranty under
section 2-314 because the magazines were not merchantable as defined or
required in the section. Though obscenity has not, heretofore, been included in the warranty of merchantability, courts can establish a new
standard.8 2 Few cases have interpreted this provision of the code, but sec25

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 5

27

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, official comment 6 to

26

2-315.

Supra note 4.

S2-314.

28 See Note, 38 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL 648, 659 (1962-3).
29

Supra note 27, official comments 1 and 8.
80 Schaffer, Sales Warranties in Illinois: Code and Pre-Code Law, 39 CHI.-Ka.rr L.
REv. 93, 117 (1962).
81 CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 192-9 (1939). "It shall be unlawful for any per-

son knowingly to exhibit, sell, print, offer to sell, give away, circulate, publish, distribute, or attempt to distribute any obscene book, magazine, pamphlet, paper, writing
card, advertisement... or other article which is obscene.....
82 Supra note 28.
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tion 2-314 has already been applied to cars,3 3 transplanted grass, 34 a defective heel, 5 and shotgun shells.3 6 Section 2-315 applies when the seller has
reason to know of the intended purpose of the sale and in each individual
case it becomes a question of fact.37 If the seller knows of the purpose he
impliedly warrants that the goods shall be fit for that purpose.38 In the
Haralampopouloscase, the defendant admittedly sold the magazines to the
plaintiff for the purpose of resale to the public. The magazines, however,
were not fit for resale and it would appear that this implied warranty of
fitness was breached.
While there are no implied warranty cases that deal with obscene magazines, an analogy can be drawn with the decision in Porterv. Craddock.3 9
In the Porter case, the defendant sold canned peach preserves to the
plaintiff who intended to resell them. The preserves delivered by the defendant were labeled incorrectly as to their net weight. Under federal
law, this constituted misbranding and they could not legally be resold and
were subject to confiscation. 40 The court held that since the goods were
misbranded and their resale was illegal, the manufacturer breached his im41
plied warranty that the goods were merchantable.
In both the Haralampopoulosand Porter cases, there was a sale of goods
in which the seller knew that the buyer's purpose was resale to the public.
In each instance, the goods that were to be resold were found to be contraband by statute and their resale unlawful; the labels on the cans were
wrong and the magazines were obscene. However, the most significant
similarity arises in the nature of the defect. The canned preserves in the
Porter case were not physically defective for the preserves would not
cause any harm to the buyer. The magazines in the Haralampopouloscase
also contained no physical defect which caused them to be unsuitable. The
court in Porter held that the seller breached his implied warranty even
though the goods were not physically defective because the preserves became unmerchantable when a statute made their resale illegal. This same
83 Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co., 211 F. Supp. 888 (E.D.Penn. 1962).
34

Bell v. Menzies, 110 Ga. App. 436, 138 S.E.2d 731 (1964).

85 Chairaluce v. Stanley Warner Management Corp., 236 F. Supp. 385 (D. Conn.
1964).
36

Allen v. Savage Arms Corp., 52 Luzerne Leg. Reg. 159 (1962).
37 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, official comment 1 to §2-315.
as Supra note 28, at 660. See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 2-315.

89 84 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Ky. 1949).
40 21 U.S.C. § 343 (a) and (e). The statute says that introduction into interstate commerce of any drug or food that is adulterated or misbranded is illegal.
41 Supra note 39.
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reasoning could be applied in the Haralampopouloscase even though the
goods involved are dissimilar. Though the Porter case and other similar
decisions 42 were decided
under the Sales Act, the outcome would be
48
similar under the Code.

It was unfortunate in the Haralampopoulosdecision that the court did
not discuss or refute plaintiff's implied warranty theory. The court decided the case on two grounds; first, that the proximate cause of plaintiff's
loss was his selling of the magazines to his customers and not the sale of
the magazines by the defendant to the plaintiff, and second, that since
the Liquor Control Commission had determined that the plaintiff knew
or should have known that the magazines were obscene, the plaintiff was
precluded from recovery. 4" As to the latter contention it would seem that
the court erred because they based their decision on a ruling of an administrative agency which was not res judicata. 4" Besides, res judicata is
only applicable when the new action is between the same parties as in the
prior proceedings. 46 The present defendant was not a party to the administrative proceedings.
It is quite possible that in the Haralampopouloscase the court could not
find that the seller breached sections 2-314 and 2-315 of the Code because
the plaintiff might well have known that the magazines were obscene and
sold them anyway. 47 However, if the plaintiff had no knowledge of the
obscenity, it appears that these sections would be applicable. This contention is based upon the analogous decisions under the Sales Act and legal
scholars' observations concerning the broad characteristics of the Code
which have been previously discussed. Since their inception, implied warranties have been constantly expanding and there can be no final determination as to their ultimate scope.
Barry Scbmarak
42 See Myers et al. v. Malone & Hyde, 173 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1949). Seller was liable
to buyer for breach of implied warranty because the canned tomatoes were not re-

salable because they were misbranded. See also Manning Mfg. Co. v. Hartol Products,

99 F.2d 813, 814 (2d Cir. 1938). The court stated, "[m]erchantability . . . includes
compliance with what the law requires."
48 Supra notes 23 and 28.
44 Supra note 4.
45 Whittle v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 211 Md. 36, 125 A.2d 41 (1956). The court
held that the doctrine of res judicata is not applicable where the earlier decision was
made by an administrative agency. See also, In re Whitford's Liquor License, 166 Pa.
Super. 48, 70 A.2d 708 (1950).
46 See U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); Scott v. Industrial Accident Commission,
46 Cal.2d 76, 293 P.2d 18 (1956); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 330 Ill. 413, 161 N.E. 723
(1928).
47 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S2-316. See also VoLD, SALES 436 (2d ed. 1959).

